

NOTES

¹ T. Storer, "A Note on Empiricism," *Philosophical Studies*, 4(No. 5):78 (1953), p. 78.

² Since 2 serves only to enable us to introduce a proposition like $D(R,Y)$, it will not be discussed.

³ For a discussion of the meaning of 'analytic' see G. Bergmann, "Two Cornerstones of Empiricism," *Synthese*, 8:435-52 (1952).

⁴ One might point out that if $D(R,Y)$ and $\sim D(R,Y)$ were both true, then the meaning of 'not' would have changed. This, however, is just another way of saying that a two-valued language would no longer be adequate. To contend at this point that the meaning of 'not' must not change is to legislate a logic applicable to the world instead of discovering one that is adequate.

⁵ Professor Bergmann has made a similar point in connection with the proposition "Everything that is green is extended." See his "Discussion of Non-Perceptual Intuition," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 10(No. 2):263-64 (1949).

The End of the Probability Syllogism?

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THE PROBLEM of whether the probability syllogism is a logical tool in good philosophical standing has been for a long time the object of intellectual debates, yet a generally accepted answer does not seem near. It is in the nature of philosophical queries to rebel against almost any answer. Thus, to deal in this short note with more than one aspect the above title might suggest would be entirely presumptuous. Indeed, I will consider here only the question of whether the probability syllogism has succumbed to Mr. Chatalian's arguments.¹ I will ignore here, therefore, whether the objective of Mr. Chatalian's attack did or did not exist. This is in perfect accord with the material implication. In other words, proving that Mr. Chatalian's arguments did not succeed in dispatching his intended victim does not bear any consequence upon the status of this victim.

Mr. Chatalian's guillotine consists mainly of the "Principle (a) . . . that, if P implies R, then the conjunct of P and Q, for any Q whatsoever, necessarily still implies R" (p. 52). With this, he decapitates the syllogisms A and A', (p. 51). But trouble for Mr. Chatalian appears as soon as one notices that neither A nor A' are probability syllogisms, at least as the Laplacean school understands this concept.² (And to whom else can we turn for a correct definition of this syllogism, if we do not want to deprive ex ante Mr. Chatalian's enterprise of all relevance?) It is by now, I believe, unanimously accepted that the probability syllogism, if it is to have any meaning at all, must fulfill the principle of total evidence.³ The